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1. Introduction 
Krugman (1990) states that the behavior of Japanese firms differs significantly from that 
of American firms. However, he does not explain why this so.1 In the last few decades, some 
Japanese economists have addressed this problem and suggested that Japanese firms are like 
labor-managed firms. They argued that Japanese firms maximize their surplus per worker. 
Komiya (1987) points out three factors that induce the Japanese firms to behave as if they were 
labor-managed firms: (1) life time employment, that is, workers, once employed, rarely leave 
the firm for which they work; (2) the top management of large Japanese firms usually comes 
from the ranks of employees who have worked for the same company since they graduated from 
school; and (3) stockholders have limited influence on Japanese firms and usually refrain from 
intervening in management affairs if the firms offer them a certain minimum rate of profit. 
Komiya concludes that executives of the Japanese firms are more like representatives of an 
employee group rather than of shareholders. 
This hypothesis, however, does not explain the fact that Japanese firms grow faster than 
American firms (see Aoki 1990). Vanek (1970) and Meade (1972) show that the labor-managed 
firm invests smaller capital than does the profit-maximizing firm. In this case, Komiya’s view 
might not hold for Japanese firms. 
Recently, foreign countries have been complaining that Japanese-style business practices 
and long-term transactions among firms prevent foreign firms from doing business in the 
Japanese market. Spencer and Qui (2001) investigate vertical relationships within Japanese auto 
corporate groups, known as keiretsu, and relationship-specific investments. They develop a 
model of procurement with relationship-specific investments by auto part suppliers. The 
automaker within keiretsu enjoys rents resulting from these investments. They explain how 
these relationships in keiretsu can create a strong impression of the “unfair” barrier to trade, 
even if the practices are not truly exclusive.2 Itoh (1992) refers to transactions such as 
subcontracting systems as organizational transactions. 3  Facing these organizational 
transactions, firms need to make a specific and partially sunk capital investment. The Japanese 
                                                  
1 See also Dore (1973). 
2 They show that the investments raise efficiency, but they limit the range of imports to less important parts, and it is possible 
that no parts are imported despite lower foreign costs. Furthermore, they point out that lack of information on investment rent 
tied with counterintuitive responses of imports to changes in output and costs could generate groundless “unfair trade barriers”. 
3 Itoh (1992) calls some aspects of long-term relationships or long-term transactions between firms in the distribution system or 
in the manufacturing sectors observed in Japan “organizational transactions”. See Itoh (1992), p. 63–64. 
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firms with organizational transactions have grown faster than have American firms. By adopting 
a subcontracting system or particular business practices, some Japanese automobile electrical 
appliances companies are proud of having rapidly grown over the last few decades. Although 
we also pay attention to the relationships within corporate groups and relationship-specific 
investments as analyzed by Spencer and Qui, we explore why Japanese firms have grown faster 
than have the American from an organization objective point of view. We shed light on the 
rationality of these business practices and on long-term transactions based on organizational 
objectives. 
In this paper, we assume that the Japanese firms try to maximize surplus per worker 
consisting of wage payments and workers’ share of the profit while the goal of the American 
firms is to maximize their profits. The framework of the paper follows the three-stage game 
model by Futagami and Okamura (1996). They investigate the strategic investment game model 
between the labor-managed firm and the profit-maximizing firm á la Brander and Spencer 
(1983a, b).4 In the first stage, both the firms decide whether to enter the market or not. In the 
second stage, they use investments as strategic variables and commit to investment levels. In the 
third stage, they play a Nash–Cournot quantity game in a product market. The reaction function 
of the labor-managed firm can run upwardly.5 The Japanese firm in this paper inherits this 
character. Therefore, the strategic effect of the Japanese firm works contrary to that of the 
American firm. If the Japanese firm raises its level of capital stock, the American firm reacts to 
reduce its output level in the third stage. Conversely, if the American firm raises its level of 
capital stock, the Japanese firm increases its output level in the third stage. The Japanese firm 
can deprive the American firm its market share by raising its level of capital stock. The 
American firm confronts a strategic substitute while the Japanese firm faces a strategic 
complement.6 
We establish that the capital–labor ratio of the Japanese firm is higher than that of the 
American firm. We also show that the Japanese firm installs more capital than does the 
profit-maximizing American firm and can survive in the market even though the American firm 
cannot earn a positive profit. Consequently, this paper explains why the Japanese firm as a 
generalized labor-managed firm holds more capital than does the American. This paper provides 
another reason why the US government and executives of the American firms complain that the 
                                                  
4 Neary and Ulph (1993) examine a similar game model. 
5 See Vanek (1970), Miyamoto (1982), and Okamura and Futagami (1996). 
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Japanese market is closed to American firms and of unfair behavior by Japanese firms. They 
insist that the American firms face great difficulties in penetrating the Japanese market. It is 
often claimed that the particular organizational form of the Japanese firms or regulation by the 
Japanese government prevents the American firms from entering the market. Stewart (1991) and 
Zhang (1993) investigate the strategic entry deterrence problem (see Dixit 1979, 1980) and 
show that the labor-managed firm could have an extreme excess capacity to deter the entry of 
the profit-maximizing firm. This paper proposes another barrier to deter entry, the 
organizational entry deterrence barrier. We show that the Japanese firms survive more easily 
than the American firms in long-run equilibrium. The Japanese firms can make a positive profit 
when the American firm makes a loss. This robustness of labor-managed firms has already been 
pointed out by Neary and Ulph (1993). They use a similar setting to our model but assume a 
duopoly under product differentiation. We formulate a simpler model, that is, the firms produce 
the homogeneous goods, and prove the same result as Neary and Ulph (1993) in duopoly 
between the Japanese firm and the American firm. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 constructs the model. Section 3 
derives the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the three-stage game. Section 4 compares the 
behavior of the Japanese firm with that of the American firm. Section 5 examines the effect of 
the fixed cost on the decision of both the firms about entering the market, and we derive the 
welfare implication of the organizational entry deterrence barrier by using a numerical 
example. Section 6 states some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The model 
We formulate a model with strategic investment as a three-stage game model. Dixit (1979, 
1980) first establishes this type of the model. Brander and Spencer (1983a, b) use Dixit’s 
method and examine the effects of strategic R&D (investment) on industry output and welfare. 
At the first stage, both the Japanese firm (J-firm) and the American firm (A-firm) decide 
whether to enter the market or not and if a firm enters, it incurs a fixed entry cost F. If both the 
firms enter, they choose investment levels in the second stage. In the third stage, the firms play 
the Nash–Cournot quantity game in a product market, taking the investment levels in the second 
stage as given. The J-firm and the A-firm supply a homogeneous good in the market. We denote 
these two firms by using superscripts J and A. Let p=p(xJ+xA) be an inverse market demand 
                                                                                                                                                                
6 See Bulow et al. (1985) p. 502. 
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function where xJ and xA are output levels of the J-firm and the A-firm, respectively. We assume 
that this demand function is downward sloping, that is 0<′p . We also assume the demand 
function satisfies the following condition: 
 
′′ + ′ <p x pA 0 .              ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (1) 
 
This condition means that the marginal revenue of the A-firm decreases as the J-firm’s output 
increases. This condition, which ensures that the reaction function of the A-firm is downward 
sloping, holds unless the demand function is too convex. 
Both the firms have the same production function f(k, n) where k(n) denotes the level of 
capital stock (labor). We assume that this production function exhibits constant returns to scale 
with diminishing marginal returns with respect to each factor, using subscripts to denote partial 
derivatives, that is, fk > 0, fn > 0, fkk < 0, fnn< 0, fkn> 0. We analyze the model by introducing a 
labor requirement function, n=φ(x; k), instead of the production function. Given the production 
function, we can represent the level of labor as a function of the levels of output and capital 
stock. We calculate partial derivatives as for the labor requirement function, 
 
φx> 0, φk< 0, φxx> 0, φkk>0, and φxk< 0.   ? ? ?                  (2) 
 
The objective of the A-firm is to maximize its own profit: 
 
max π = p(xJ + xA)xA – wAnA – vAkA – F,  s.t. nA=φ(xA;kA)            (3) 
 
where wA and vA show a wage rate and a rental rate of capital for the A-firm. On the other hand, 
the J-firm is assumed to maximize an income per worker consisting of wage payment and share 
of profit that goes to the workers: 
 
,])([max J
JJJJJAJJJ
n
FkvnwxxxpnwV −−−++= β   s.t. nJ=φ(xJ;kJ)       (4) 
 
where wJ and vJ denote corresponding terms for the J-firm, and 1–β is the ratio of profit paid out 
as dividends (dividend ratio) and 0 <β≤ 1. The J-firm takes β as a constant parameter. Therefore, 
if β=1, the J-firm coincides with the labor-managed firm. The large value of β means the weak 
 5
power of stockholders of the J-firm. 
 
3. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
In this section, we derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. First, we 
seek the third-stage Nash–Cournot equilibrium with the levels of capital stock kJ and kA already 
determined. The equilibrium occurs when each firm maximizes its objective with respect to its 
own output level, equivalently, levels of labor input given the output level of its rival. This 
equilibrium satisfies the first-order conditions: 
 
J-firm: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),;,0;, JJJJxJJJJJJAJJ kxFkvpxpxpkxxHx
V φφφφ ≡=−−−+′≡=
∂
∂       (5) 
A-firm: ( ) ( ),;,0;, AAAAxAAAJAA kxwpxpkxxGx φφφ
π
≡=−+′≡=
∂
∂                      (6) 
 
and the second-order conditions: 
 
J-firm: ,0][]2[);,(1 <−−−′+′′≡
J
xx
JJJJJJAJ FkvpxpxpkxxH φφ  
A-firm: ,02);,(1 <−′+′′≡
A
xx
AAAAA wpxpkxxG φ  
 
where H1=
∂
∂
H
x J
 and G1=
∂
∂
G
x A
. The subscripts stand for the partial derivative with the 
corresponding arguments. Equations (5) and (6) define the reaction functions of both the firms 
as follows; xJ=RJ(xA; kJ), xA=RA(xJ; kA), given the capital stocks, kA and kJ. If we examine slopes 
of the reaction functions, for the reaction function of the J-firm, we obtain 
 
∂
∂
R
x
H
H
J
A = −
2
1
, 
 
where H p x p xJ J J x
J J
2 = ′′ + ′ −φ φ φ( ) . Because we show φ φ φxxJ J xJ Jx> − <0 0, ,  if the 
demand function is concave or not too convex, H2 becomes positive and the reaction function of 
the J-firm runs upwardly. We assume 0>A
J
x
R
∂
∂  hereafter. As for the A-firm, we obtain 
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∂
∂
R
x
G
G
A
J = −
2
1
,  
 
where G p x pA2 = ′′ + ′ . Condition (1) implies G2 < 0, and the reaction function of the A-firm 
runs downwardly. 
A change of capital stock of each firm shifts its own reaction function. By differentiating 
the reaction functions, we have 
 
∂
∂
R
k
H
H
J
J = −
3
1
,  ∂∂
R
k
G
G
A
A = − >
3
1
0,  
 
where H p x p v px v k FJ k
J J
x
J J J J
xk
J
3 ≡ ′ + + − − −( ) ( )φ φ φ  and G w A xkA3 = − φ >0. To determine 
the sign of H3, we need the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1 
If the elasticity of substitution of the production function is not larger than one, then H3 takes a 
positive value. 
Proof.  See Futagami and Okamura (1996). 
 
We assume that the elasticity of substitution of the production function is not larger than one. 
Figures 1 and 2 depict how each reaction function shifts rightward if its own capital stock 
increases. 
An intersection of the reaction functions, xJ=RJ(xA; kJ) and xA=RA(xJ; kA), gives the 
third-stage Nash equilibrium as follows: 
 
xJ=gJ(kJ;  kA), 
xA=gA(kA;  kJ). 
 
The third-stage Nash equilibrium depends on the levels of capital stock that the two firms 
choose in the second stage. We examine how the levels of capital stock change the third-stage 
Nash equilibrium outputs. By totally differentiating (5) and (6), we have 
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dx G H dk H G dkJ J A= − +1 1 3 2 3∆
( ),                       (7) 
dx G H dk H G dkA J A= − +1 2 3 1 3∆
( ),                       (8) 
 
where ∆≡H1G1–H2G2>0. Consequently, we obtain the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2 
An increase of the capital stock of the J-firm raises its own output, while it reduces the output of 
the A-firm of the third-stage Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, an increase of the capital 
stock of the A-firm raises both the output levels of the third-stage Nash equilibrium, that is, 
∂
∂
x
k
J
J > 0 , 
∂
∂
x
k
A
J < 0 , 
∂
∂
x
k
J
A > 0 , 
∂
∂
x
k
A
A > 0 . 
 
Because an increase in kJ shifts the reaction function of the J-firm outward, the third-stage Nash 
equilibrium moves from E1 to E2 (see Figure 1). On the other hand, an increase in kA also pushes 
the reaction of the A-firm outward, hence, the third-stage Nash equilibrium moves from E3 to E4 
(see Figure 2). 
Next, we consider the second stage of the game. The two firms choose levels of capital 
stock taking account of the third-stage Nash equilibrium. The necessary conditions are given by 
 
( ) ,0=−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
′=
J
k
JJJJJ
J
A
J
J Fkvpxk
xxp
dk
dV φφν∂
∂                     (9) 
.0=−−′= AAk
A
A
J
A
A vwk
xxp
dk
d φ∂
∂π                          (10) 
 
We assume that the second-order conditions of these maximization problems are satisfied. 
Equations (5), (6), (9), and (10) determine the full equilibrium values of kJ, kA, xJ, and xA. The 
equilibrium levels of labor, nJ and nA are derived from the labor requirement functions. 
 
4. Which firm invests and produces more? 
In this section we examine whether the A-firm or the J-firm invests and produces more. 
We consider the following benchmark case: 
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w px w n v k F
n
wJ
J J J J J
J
A+
− − −
=
β[ ] .                   (11) 
 
This relationship means that workers hired by the J-firm receive the same income as the 
A-firm’s workers. When the J-firm and the A-firm employ their workers in the same labor 
market, competitive pressure forces both the firms to pay the same wages to their workers. 
Furthermore, vJ=vA ≡ v holds under a perfect competitive capital market. 
We can state the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
If the J-firm makes a positive profit, then the J-firm adopts higher capital intensity technology 
than does the A-firm in the benchmark case, that is, k
n
k
n
J
J
A
A> . 
Proof.  From the first-order conditions, (9) and (10), we obtain 
 
( )
− =
− −
− ′
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−
1
1
φ
φ
∂
∂
k
J
J J J
J
A
J
px vk F
v p x x
k
( )
,  
− =
− ′
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
φ ∂
∂
k
A
A
A
J
A
w
v p x x
k
.  
From lemma 2, the denominator of –1/φkJ is smaller than that of –1/φkA. From the benchmark 
condition (11), we have 
 
( ) { } ( ) .01)1( >−−=−−−−=−−− JJAJJJJJAJJ nwwFknwpxnwFvkpx β
β
νβ  
 
As the J-firm makes a positive profit, wJ < wA holds. The numerator of –1/φkJ is larger than that 
of –1/φkA. We then show that –1/φkJ ?–1/φkA. As –1/φki=fni/fki (i=J, A) and they increase with 
capital labor ratio k/n, we reach the desired result.   Q.E.D. 
 
From the above proposition, we can also prove that 
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f
f
w
v
f
f
n
J
k
J
A
n
A
k
A> > .  
 
This inequality leads to the following corollary of proposition 1, as fnJ/fkJ ? wJ/v holds if the 
J-firm earns a positive profit. 
 
Corollary 1 
If the J-firm earns a positive profit, then the J-firm uses more capital-intensive technology, 
while the A-firm adopts more labor-intensive technology compared with the cost-minimizing 
technology. 
 
Miyazaki (1984) establishes that the labor-managed firm prefers a higher capital–labor ratio to 
the profit-maximizing firm. We have confirmed his result in this game theoretical framework. 
We proceed to prove that the J-firm can employ more capital and produce more than does the 
A-firm. 
 
Proposition 2 
If the J-firm makes a positive profit and β is close to one, then the J-firm employs more capital 
and produces more than does the A-firm. 
Proof.  Because ( )
∂
∂
f
k n
kf
n
n kk
/
= −  > 0, proposition 1 indicates fnA < fnJ, that is φxA  > φxJ. From 
(5) and equality (11), we get 
 
( )′ + = − −⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟p x p w w
J A J
x
J1 1
β
β
β φ .  
 
By using (6), we can rearrange the above expression as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) .1 A
x
J
xAJ
x
JJ pxpwpxp φ
φφββ +′=−++′  
 
Summarizing the above argument, when β=1 (the J-firm completely coincides to the 
labor-managed firm), then ′ + < ′ +p x p p x pJ A . That is, we have xJ > xA. If β is close to one, we 
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can have the same inequality. Suppose that the contrary, JA kk ≥ , holds. From proposition 1, 
nA > nJ, hence, xA > xJ. This relation contradicts xJ > xA. Then, JA kk ≥ must hold.   Q.E.D. 
 
We have shown that the J-firm can have more capital than does the A-firm if the J-firm 
behaves as the generalized labor-managed firm. The intuition behind proposition 2 is that the 
marginal revenue of the J-firm increases with the strategic term, ′p x x
k
J
A
J
∂
∂  > 0. On the contrary, 
the marginal revenue of the A-firm decreases with the strategic term 0<′ A
J
A
k
xxp ∂
∂ . 
 
5. Organizational entry deterrence 
We consider the situation in which entry cost increases so that it becomes more difficult 
for each firm to enter the market, because the increase harms the firms’ profits. If a firm cannot 
earn positive profits, the firm that makes a loss exits the market. We address which firm is more 
robust against the increase in entry cost. By using proposition 2, we can show the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 
Suppose β is close to one. Even if the profit of the A-firm is zero, the J-firm can make a positive 
profit in the benchmark case. 
Proof.  At the second-stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( )w
p x x x w x k vk F
x k
wJ
x k
A J J J J J J
J J
A
J J
+
+ − − −
=
∗
β ϕφmax
;
;,
 , 
 
where xA* denotes the output of the A-firm supplied optimally and xJ* shows the optimal choice 
by the J-firm. Therefore, we obtain 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) .,;
; kxallforw
kx
Fvkkxwxxxpw A
JA
J ≤
−−−+
+
∗
φ
ϕβ  
 
Because xA* < xJ*, 
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( ) ( )[ ]
( ) .,;
; kxallforw
kx
Fvkkxwxxxpw A
JJ
J <
−−−+
+
∗
φ
ϕβ  
 
By rearranging this, we obtain 
 
( )[ ] ( )( ) .,01 kxallfornwwFvknwxxxp AJAJ <−−+−−−+ ∗ ββ  
 
When the A-firm makes zero profit, wJ < wA must hold; hence, the J-firm earns a positive profit 
because of (11).   Q.E.D. 
 
To examine how the level of the fixed cost affects the profits of both the firms, we specify 
the demand and the production function by 
 
                 AJAJ xxaxxp −−=+ )( , 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? knnkf =),( . 
The labor requirement function derives from 
 
                 
k
xkx
2
);( =φ  
 
After some manipulations, we obtain four equations that define the perfect Nash equilibrium. 
 
          ,0)2()(})){(( 22 =−−+−−+ AJJAJJA xxaxxFxaxxa  
          ,0)2(4)2)(( 22 =+−−+−−−+ AJJAJAJA xxaxaxawvxxaaxxa  
          },2){(
2
1 Fxxa
v
k JAJ −−=  
          ,
2
2
JA
A
A
xxa
wxk
−−
=  
          .0 axx JA <+<  
 
Suppose that a=11, v=1, and w=1. By numerical calculations, we depict Figure 3, which 
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describes the relationship between the fixed cost F and each firm’s profit.7 The curves labeled 
aπ  and jπ  are the profits of the A-firm and the J-firm, respectively, while that of mjπ  shows 
the profit of the J-firm when it is a monopolist. This figure implies that both the profits ( aπ  and 
jπ ) decrease as fixed cost increases. For the small amount of the fixed cost, F∈(0, FN), the 
A-firm’s profit exceeds that of the J-firm and vice versa. The profit of the A-firm is decreasing 
more rapidly than the J-firm’s. When the A-firm cannot earn a positive profit at FMin and exits 
the market, the J-firm makes a positive profit. If the fixed cost is smaller than FMin, both the 
A-firm and the J-firm can coexist in the market. Otherwise, only the J-firm can operate and the 
resulting market structure becomes a monopoly of the J-firm. The difference in organizational 
form of each firm generates this market structure. By taking advantage of the difference, the 
Japanese government can prevent the A-firm from penetrating its domestic market. Suppose that 
the fixed cost is small, that is, F < FMin initially, and the A-firm can supply its product in the 
Japanese market. Consider that the Japanese government imposes a franchise fee on both the 
firms and the total fixed cost exceeds FMin.8 The A-firm is forced to exit the market, while the 
J-firm can survive. The Japanese government can deter the entry of the A-firm by setting the fee 
as high as possible to protect the J-firm. 
We can also imagine the following situation. The A-firm that has decided to enter the 
Japanese market does not have the expertise to transact within Japanese-style business practices 
and to keep long-term transactions within the wholesale network. The firm must then form its 
own distribution or sales system to supply its products. To establish this system in Japan, the 
A-firm has to incur a high cost, which is the fixed entry cost. It is difficult for the A-firm to earn 
a positive profit when paying this entry cost. This high fixed cost of constructing its own 
distribution or sales system, combined with the particular organizational form of the J-firm, can 
work as an entry deterrence barrier against the A-firm. The organizational structure of the J-firm 
results in an entry barrier against the A-firm. The high fixed cost generates an organizational 
entry deterrence barrier against the profit-maximizing firm. 
Next we discuss the effect of this organizational entry deterrence barrier on social welfare. 
                                                  
7 We also calculate the profits of the J-firm and the A-firm, supposing that these parameters take other values (a=9 and 15, v= 
0.5 and 1.5, and w=0.5 and 1.5). In the cases of other parameter values, the qualitative relationship between the profit and the 
fixed cost is invariant. 
8 For example, if a new entrant intends to enter a market of the industry under regulation of the Japanese government, then it 
has to have the authorization to enter the market, without regard to a Japanese firm or an American.  It takes much time and  
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We adopt the consumer surplus and the profits of both the A-firm and the J-firm to evaluate the 
social welfare. We calculate these surpluses in the case that a=11, v=1, and w=1.9 Figure 4 
depicts the relationships between these surpluses and the level of the fixed cost in this case. The 
dotted curve labeled W-Surplus shows the sum of the consumer surplus and the profits of the 
J-firm and the A-firm, that is, the total surplus of this world. This curve is declining 
monotonously. The curve of J-Surplus shows the sum of the consumer surplus and the profit of 
only the J-firm, that is, the total surplus of Japan. The J-Surplus curve has a peak before it 
intersects the W-surplus curve. The total surplus when only the J-firm survives and operates in 
this market is shown by the curve named JM-Surplus. This curve has a peak like the J-Surplus 
curve. The profits of both the firms are calculated by subtracting the fixed cost, so the surplus is 
the net one. FMin is the level of the fixed cost at which the curve of W-Surplus intersects that of 
J-Surplus. Below that level of the fixed cost, the A-firm makes a loss and exits the market. 
Figure 4 suggests the following welfare implication. When the Japanese firm raises the 
fixed cost over FMin by making the relationship-specific investment, it can eject the A-firm from 
the Japanese market. Only the J-firm can operate in the market, but total output is smaller than 
when both the firms coexist and produce. Consumer surplus declines because of the smaller 
output while the profit of the J-firm increases as compared with the case when both the firms 
operate. The decrease of consumer surplus exceeds the increased profit of the J-firm. The total 
surplus becomes smaller than that when both the A-firm and the J-firm operate in the market. 
By using the entry deterrence barrier with the high fixed cost and the organizational difference 
between the J-firm and the A-firm, the Japanese firm succeeds in protecting itself but it entails 
welfare losses for consumers in Japan. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine a duopoly with a Japanese firm (J-firm), which behaves like a 
generalized labor-managed firm, and an American firm (A-firm), which maximizes its profit 
competing in the homogeneous product market. We prove that the J-firm employs more capital 
and produces more than the A-firm does. This result is consistent with the empirical results of 
Dertouzos et al (1989). They find that the ratio of R&D investment of Japanese firms 
outnumbers that of American firms. The structure of this paper provides an explanation of their 
                                                                                                                                                                
trouble to get permission from the authority.  That may cost too much for the entrant. 
9 We also calculate the cases of the other parameter values of a (a=9 and 15 with w=1 and v=1) and v (v=0.5 
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findings. 
This paper also explains the role that organizational transactions (Japanese-style business 
practices and long-term transactions) play as nontariff entry barriers. This explanation differs 
from that of Spencer and Qui (2001). When Japanese firms behave like generalized 
labor-managed firms, it is rational for many Japanese firms to engage in Japanese-style 
business practices and to establish long-term transactions, even if that requires particular 
investments. Consequently, the organizational transactions among the Japanese firms function as 
strategic nontariff entry barriers. 
We examine the effects of the higher fixed cost on the welfare of the economy by using a 
numerical example. The Japanese firm raises its fixed cost by some means and can prevent the 
A-firm from doing business in the domestic market. But this is realized at the expense of 
consumers in Japan because of the smaller output. The detailed impact of this organizational 
structure on the welfare of the economy should be examined in future research. 
                                                                                                                                                                
and 1.5 with a=11 and w=1), and obtain the same qualitative results. 
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